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ABSTRACT: The moral and social norms that bear on contracts of 
adhesion suggest a deep ambivalence. Contracts are perceived as serious 
moral obligations, and yet they must be taken lightly or everyday commerce 
would be impossible. Most people see consent to boilerplate as less 
meaningful than consent to negotiated terms, but they nonetheless would 
hold consumers strictly liable for both. This Essay aims to unpack the beliefs, 
preferences, assumptions, and biases that constitute our assessments of 
assent to boilerplate. Research suggests that misgivings about procedural 
defects in consumer contracting weigh heavily on judgments of contract 
formation, but play almost no role in judgments of blame for transactional 
harms. Using experimental methods from the psychology of judgment and 
decision-making, I test the psychological explanations for this disjunction, 
including motivated reasoning and reliance on availability heuristics. 
Many commentators have argued that even though it is true that disclosures 
are probably ineffective, they “can’t hurt.” I conclude with a challenge to 
that proposition—I argue that the can’t-hurt attitude may lead to overuse of 
disclosures that do not affect consumer decision-making, but have implicit 
effects on the moral calculus of transactional harms. 
  
 
         Assistant Professor of Law and Psychology, University of Pennsylvania Law School. I am 
very grateful for David Hoffman’s comments on an earlier draft, and for feedback from 
participants in the American University faculty workshop and the University of Minnesota Law 
and Economics seminar. This Essay benefitted greatly from the able research assistance of 
Liann Sun, Bonnie White, and Ryan Wolf.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The proposition that most people do not read the small print, heed the 
warning labels, or review the “Terms and Conditions” links, is no longer 
controversial. Nonetheless, the barrage of fine-print disclosures continues 
unabated, and enforcement of universally unread terms is assumed. The 
juxtaposition of these facts of modern contracting—widespread reliance on 
disclosures to protect consumers and widespread agreement that disclosures 
do not affect consumer behavior—is somewhat puzzling. Contracts scholars 
have largely approached this puzzle in normative terms, attempting to 
reconcile the idea of meaningful assent with the core contract doctrine of 
implied consent to unread terms. What scholars have overlooked in this 
discussion is a coherent descriptive theory of modern contracting. How do 
ordinary consumers understand their contractual obligations when 
formation of most contracts is perfunctory, but the moral and legal rhetoric 
of contract enforcement is robust? A psychological account of consumer 
consent sheds new light on the costs and benefits of fine-print contracting. 
Consent to standard terms occupies an uneasy place in the existing 
research on the moral psychology of contracts. The relevant moral and 
social norms that bear on contracts of adhesion evince a deep cultural 
ambivalence. Contracts are understood to be serious moral obligations, and 
yet everyday commercial activity requires that consumers sign agreements 
that contain terms they have not read. Most people see consent to 
boilerplate as less meaningful than consent to negotiated terms, but 
nonetheless would hold consumers strictly liable for both. This is an area 
with unclear—if not bipolar—norms, and we do not know how individuals 
assimilate conflicting preferences and bodies of evidence into judgments of 
consumer consent. 
At a broad level, this Essay attempts to tease out the beliefs, preferences, 
assumptions, and biases that constitute our assessments of assent to 
boilerplate. To do this, I use methods from the psychology of judgment and 
decision-making. This Essay presents five short vignette studies about 
transacting by boilerplate in an effort to examine how consumers think 
about modern contracting, and how the context of modern contracting 
bears on judgments of transactional harms. I argue that most people are 
sensitive to the realities of contracting via boilerplate, and are concerned 
that consent to fine print is compromised consent. Nonetheless, the 
vignettes suggest, when it comes to explaining transactional harms,1 blaming 
the consumer who consented to the agreement for the harm is both 
psychologically attractive as well as cognitively available. Even in the face of 
 
 1. In this Essay, I will use the phrase “transactional harm” to refer loosely to a broad class 
of unfavorable results in consumer transactions, principally those that result from enforcement 
of unfavorable terms. 
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evidence of procedural defects or wrongdoing by the drafter, participants’ 
instincts were to hold the consumer to the boilerplate terms. 
My argument unfolds in two steps, focusing first on assent and then on 
enforcement. The first proposition is that the social practice of consumer 
contracting invokes powerful but conflicting norms and intuitions. Most 
people have strong feelings about individual autonomy in the marketplace, 
coupled with concerns about both the effectiveness of fine-print disclosures 
and the potential for drafters’ strategic behavior to go unchecked. When 
asked to think about contract formation, the participants in the studies 
reported in this Essay recognized that readership of some terms is an 
unrealistic expectation, and expressed doubts that consent to boilerplate is 
meaningful. In other words, when people are asked to think about how we 
make contracts in the modern world, they show real ambivalence about 
consent to boilerplate. 
The puzzle is that this ambivalence seems to dissipate entirely when 
questions about consent come up in the context of contract enforcement. 
Once the framing is about how to understand a transactional harm—the 
enforcement of an unfavorable term—the subjects in these studies agreed 
that a non-reading consumer has clearly consented to be bound and ought 
to bear the blame for the bad outcome, no matter how cumbersome the 
demands of readership. Thus, the second step of my argument is that when 
confronted with the task of explaining a harmful event, there is a shift in 
motivation and in cognition. The motivation to assign blame (and to assign 
blame in a psychologically comfortable way) increases, and some causal 
explanations of the harm grow more salient than others, drawing attention 
to the consumer’s consent and away from other contributing factors. These 
studies suggest that we understand consent one way in the context of 
contract formation, and another in the context of enforcement. 
The unread fine print has been at the center of a number of recent 
national debates, including subprime mortgage lending,2 hurricane 
insurance,3 universal default clauses in credit-card contracts,4 and hidden 
 
 2. Aaron Smith, Note, A Suitability Standard for Mortgage Brokers: Developing a Common Law 
Theory, 17 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 377, 389 (2010) (“Unlike other business transactions 
where the customers understand what they are buying and what the alternatives are, mortgage 
customers are unlikely to comprehend the fine print that is so critical in modern mortgages.”). 
 3. Jay S. Goldbaum, Comment, Katrina and Beyond: Judicial Treatment of Boilerplate 
Language in Standardized Insurance Contracts, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 453, 45455 (discussing 
insurance litigation in Mississippi following Hurricane Katrina which turned on boilerplate 
“flood exclusion” language). 
 4. Mary Beth Matthews, The Credit CARD Act of 2009—What Is It, and What Does It Do?, 
2010 ARK. L. NOTES 65, 68 (including universal default provisions among credit card practices 
targeted by the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009). 
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fees in banking contracts.5 These debates raise questions of consumer 
responsibility, the duties of institutional parties drafting take-it-or-leave-it 
forms, and the background realities of consumer contracting in the modern 
world. Behavioral researchers have argued for decades that it is utterly 
unrealistic to think that consumers can read and process fine-print 
disclosures.6 Not only are form contracts unread, they are functionally 
unreadable (or at least indigestible) for consumers with bounded cognitive 
capacity—i.e., everyone. The now well-trodden biases that result from 
limited attentional resources have straightforward implications in the 
boilerplate context. Distorted risk perceptions, salience biases, and framing 
effects make it very unlikely that consumers will read the terms of form 
contracts—and even if they do read the terms, it is unlikely that they will 
integrate the information into their decision-making process in a sensible 
way.7 
Nevertheless, the legal response to this evidence from behavioral 
economics has been somewhat dismissive. Modern contracts scholarship 
evinces a shared sense that the primary function of fine-print disclosure is 
not consumer information at all, but rather justification of a crucial legal 
fiction. A robust doctrine of implied consent to unread or unnoticed terms 
is central to the laws governing millions of transactions a day, including 
consumer contracting, product liability, informed consent to medical care, 
real property transfers, advertising, and financial planning. Because real 
readership is understood to be a lost cause, most scholarly support of 
mandatory disclosure policies stipulates that disclosures are unhelpful to 
consumers, and the scholars justify enforcement of unread terms on 
 
 5. Cindy Perman, Gotcha! Ways Banks Burn You with Hidden Fees, CNBC (Feb. 15, 2011, 
3:39 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/41604971/Gotcha_Ways_Banks_Burn_You_With_ 
Hidden_Fees (detailing different forms of banking fees that catch consumers by surprise). 
 6. See, e.g., Kesten C. Green & J. Scott Armstrong, Evidence on the Effects of Mandatory 
Disclaimers in Advertising, 31 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 293, 293 (2012) (examining eighteen 
experimental studies and concluding that there is “no evidence that consumers benefit from 
government-mandated disclaimers in advertising”); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Does Contract 
Disclosure Matter?, 168 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 94, 96 (2012) (“[I]ncreasing 
contract accessibility does not result in a meaningful increase in readership. . . . [T]hose (few) 
shoppers who actually read the contract do not respond to what they see there.”).  
 7. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. 
REV. 211, 240–43 (1995) (asserting that cognitive problems such as “bounded rationality, 
optimistic disposition, systematic underestimation of risks,” undue weight on the present as 
compared with the future, and rational ignorance cause consumers “to remain ignorant of the 
preprinted terms” of a form contract). 
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normative grounds, with reference to constructs like opportunity to read,8 
blanket assent,9 or rational ignorance.10 
This Essay demonstrates that psychology research has a role to play in 
the mandatory-disclosure debate that extends beyond documenting 
cognitive errors. The experimental studies reported below explore how 
consumers themselves understand consent to fine print—the psychology of 
judgment rather than the psychology of decision-making. This analysis tries 
to explore this question systematically, unpacking the psychological 
processes that bear on a commonsense morality of informed consent. I 
argue that the moral psychology of consumer contracting beliefs can be 
understood as bearing on two sets of judgments: (1) ex ante assessments of 
contract formation; and (2) ex post assessments of consumer liability when a 
warned-of harm comes to pass. Misgivings about procedural defects in 
consumer contracting weigh heavily on judgments of contract formation, 
but appear to play almost no role in judgments of blame for transactional 
harms. 
The Essay proceeds as follows. In Part I, I set up the problem with 
descriptive, legal, and theoretical perspectives on consent to fine print in 
consumer contracting. Part II lays out evidence, from existing and new 
research, that consumer contracting invokes conflicting norms. Study 1 in 
this Part tests the relationship between contract procedures and inferences 
of consent, and the results show evidence that subjects may believe that it is 
unreasonable to expect consumers to read terms in some forms, but that 
they would nonetheless hold those non-reading consumers accountable for 
transactional harms that occur ex post. Parts III and IV make the case that 
there are psychological explanations—involving a particular set of 
motivations, intuitions, and cognitive processes—for these differential 
evaluations of consent at the formation and enforcement stages of 
contracting. In Part III, I present Studies 2 and 3, offering evidence that the 
mere fact of consumer harm motivates inferences of consumer consent to 
 
 8. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. 
L. REV. 647, 734 (2011) (describing the argument that mandatory disclosures promote the 
values of “autonomy, dignity, civility, community, citizenship, [and] economic growth” by 
presenting consumers with an opportunity to read). 
 9. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 370 (1960) 
(“Instead of thinking about ‘assent’ to boiler-plate clauses, we can recognize that so far as 
concerns the specific, there is no assent at all.  What has in fact been assented to, specifically, 
are the few dickered terms, and the broad type of the transaction, and but one thing more. 
That one thing more is a blanket assent (not a specific assent) to any not unreasonable or 
indecent terms the seller may have on his form, which do not alter or eviscerate the reasonable 
meaning of the dickered terms.”). 
 10. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive 
Consumer Markets, in BOILERPLATE: THE FOUNDATION OF MARKET CONTRACTS 3, 8 (Omri Ben-
Shahar ed., 2007) (“The novelty of the present analysis is that the same contract forms that are 
widely assumed to be based on consumer ignorance can be shown to be consistent with 
competition under conditions of full information.”). 
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that harm. Part IV includes Studies 4 and 5, which show that consumer 
decision-making is a highly salient link in the chain of causation that 
explains a transactional harm. Part V concludes with a discussion of these 
findings in light of procedural justice research, and I argue that the next 
step in the moral psychology of contracting is the development of a robust 
body of research on procedural justice in the consumer marketplace. 
I. MODERN CONSUMER CONTRACTING 
A. BOILERPLATE IS UBIQUITOUS AND UNREAD 
Most user agreements, terms of credit, informed-consent forms, and 
product warranties (to name a few) are long and difficult to understand.11 
Furthermore, most disclosures arise in an already crowded field of 
boilerplate. As such, most people have no choice but to perform a kind of 
triage on their reading priorities due to the overwhelming volume of 
information that disclosees face in a given day. To make this point, I rely 
heavily on the definitive account of disclosure overload by Omri Ben-Shahar 
and Carl Schneider.12 In addition to their meticulous chronicling of the 
omnipresent fine print of modern life, they give a witty yet all-too-real 
account of a day in the world of “Chris Consumer.” Chris confronts detailed 
terms and conditions for his vitamins, his toaster, his car mechanic, an 
online news service, a web browser, his bank, a diner menu, a flu shot, and 
Monday Night Football, among others.13 Disclosures, fine print, standard 
terms—these are unavoidable facts of modern life. 
Nonetheless—or perhaps, as a result—one of the truisms of empirical 
contracts research is that “nobody reads.” This is particularly true of online 
contracts, including end-user license agreements and click-through 
agreements that retail sites use. One recent study documented the lack of 
readership in painstaking detail.14 Out of 120,545 consumer visits to online 
 
 11. See Skelton v. Gen. Motors Corp., 660 F.2d 311, 313–14 (7th Cir. 1981) (describing a 
statute’s drafters’ concern that “consumer product warranties often were too complex to be 
understood”); Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 8, at 671–72 (citing evidence that 
“readership is effectively zero”); Michael K. Paasche-Orlow et al., Readability Standards for 
Informed-Consent Forms as Compared with Actual Readability, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 721, 724 (2003) 
(reporting that “only 8 percent [of medical schools] . . . met their own standards” for 
readability of informed-consent forms); Chris Kaiser, Complex Drug Labels May Be Information 
Overload, MEDPAGE TODAY (May 24, 2011), http://www.medpagetoday.com/PublicHealth 
Policy/FDAGeneral/26665 (“[T]he effectiveness of labeling in communicating adverse drug 
events may be diminished by the problem of overwarning, in which excessively long and 
complex lists of potential reactions can result in information overload . . . .” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 12. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 8, at 704–09. 
 13. Id. at 705–08. 
 14. See Yannis Bakos et al., Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Testing a Law and Economics 
Approach to Standard Form Contracts (N.Y. Univ. Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Org., Working Paper No. 
09-40, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1443256. 
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retail sites, 55 of those users clicked through to see the terms and 
conditions15—this is roughly one out of 2200 users. The users who did click 
through spent a median of 29 seconds looking at the entire multi-page 
agreement.16 
Even when investigators choose more elite population samples, they still 
find very low levels of readership. In a sample of University of Georgia 
undergraduates, 89% of respondents classified themselves as “non-readers” 
of click-through agreements.17 A survey of law students—a group essentially 
hand-picked for its propensity to read legal documents—found that only 
about 4% claim to read standard online form contracts.18 All available 
evidence suggests that online form contracts are consistently unread. 
Online forms are not the only contracts that consumers are ignoring. 
Although there is surprisingly little empirical evidence on non-readership 
outside of the online context, contracts scholars regard non-readership as 
“folk knowledge”: a claim so obvious that data would be superfluous.19 In 
one of the first empirical accounts of contracts behavior, Stewart Macaulay 
reported that even businessmen did not read the contracts they regularly 
signed in the course of their commercial interactions, preferring to rely on 
their background sense of the deal and the counterparty.20 Courts and 
scholars alike have noticed a similar pattern in the readership of form 
contracts generally. As early as 1983, well before the advent of EULAs (end-
user license agreements) and click-throughs, Todd Rakoff wrote: 
[T]he adhering party is in practice unlikely to have read the 
standard terms before signing the document and is unlikely to have 
understood them if he has read them. Virtually every scholar who 
has written about contracts of adhesion has accepted the truth of 
this assertion, and the few empirical studies that have been done 
have agreed.21 
 
 15. Id. at 26. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Victoria C. Plaut & Robert P. Bartlett, III, Blind Consent? A Social Psychological 
Investigation of Non-Readership of Click-Through Agreements, 36 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 293, 297 (2012). 
 18. Robert A. Hillman, Online Consumer Standard Form Contracting Practices: A Survey and 
Discussion of Legal Implications, in CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF THE ‘INFORMATION 
ECONOMY’ 283, 289 (Jane K. Winn ed., 2006). 
 19. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 8, at 671 (“Empirical work is scant, perhaps 
because of the folk knowledge that no one reads boilerplate.”). 
 20. Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. 
REV. 55, 59 (1963). 
 21. Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 
1179 (1983) (footnote omitted). 
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The reality is that reading is costly, especially in a world in which 
everything comes with extensive standard terms.22 Meanwhile, the expected 
benefit of any investment in reading standard terms is low for three reasons: 
(1) the transaction itself is minor; (2) the probability of unfavorable terms is 
low;23 and (3) the probability of a given consumer being affected by an 
unfavorable term is low.24 
The proposition that consumers do not read contracts of adhesion is 
increasingly uncontroversial, cited by legal scholars to support claims that 
consumers are rationally ignorant,25 that consumers are ignorant dupes,26 
and that contracts of adhesion are inefficient in any case.27 It is now a given 
that we live in a world in which boilerplate terms are ubiquitous yet 
unknown, ever present and never read. In the next two Subparts, I consider 
the relevant legal doctrines and the scholarly responses. 
B. CONTRACT DOCTRINE: DUTY TO READ 
The vast majority of terms no one reads are enforceable. As a matter of 
black letter law, not knowing the terms of one’s contract does not excuse a 
party from liability.28 This doctrine is often referred to as a party’s “duty to 
read,”29 and it has been at the center of a number of recent national debates 
around subprime mortgage lending,30 insurance coverage after Hurricane 
Katrina,31 universal default clauses in credit card contracts,32 and hidden 
 
 22. Eric Posner has argued that the advantage of a decision like ProCD v. Zeidenberg, in 
which Judge Easterbrook enforced terms that were not available to the consumer until after 
purchase, is that consumers cannot, in practice, handle getting all the terms up front. 
Commerce would grind to a halt while consumers wasted their time listening to the “droning 
voice” of the sales staff reading the terms aloud.  Eric A. Posner, ProCD v. Zeidenberg and 
Cognitive Overload in Contractual Bargaining, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1181, 1183–84 (2010). 
 23. See Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Are “Pay Now, Terms Later” Contracts Worse for Buyers? 
Evidence from Software License Agreements, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 309 (2009). 
 24. See Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 243. 
 25. Id. at 241–43. 
 26. See W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 
84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 531 (1971) (“An unfair form will not deter sales because the seller can 
easily arrange his sales so that few if any buyers will read his forms, whatever their terms, and he 
risks nothing because the law will treat his forms as contracts anyway.”). 
 27. See Lee Goldman, My Way and the Highway: The Law and Economics of Choice of Forum 
Clauses in Consumer Form Contracts, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 700, 716–21 (1992) (rejecting economists’ 
assertions that contracts of adhesion are efficient). 
 28. See 27 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 
§ 70:113 (4th ed. 2003) (“A written contract speaks for itself and, absent fraud or 
mistake, ignorance of contents will not allow one to avoid its contents.”). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Smith, supra note 2, at 389 (“Unlike other business transactions where the customers 
understand what they are buying and what the alternatives are, mortgage customers are unlikely 
to comprehend the fine print that is so critical in modern mortgages.”). 
 31. Goldbaum, supra note 3, at 454–55 (discussing insurance litigation in Mississippi 
following Hurricane Katrina which turned on boilerplate “flood exclusion” language). 
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fees in banking contracts.33 In some cases—universal default clauses, for 
example—legislatures have stepped in to regulate terms perceived as 
unfair.34 
Under the common law, though, most of these problematic clauses are 
relatively easy cases. Non-readership is no excuse, even when the facts are 
sympathetic. For example, the Fifth Circuit held that insurance 
policyholders denied compensation after Hurricane Katrina were bound to 
the written terms even where the salesman had represented that the policy’s 
coverage included the denied claims; the court ruled that, “The insured is 
bound by [written] policy language that would put a reasonable person on 
notice of limitations to the agent’s authority.”35 In another case, a party 
subject to a forum-selection clause argued that the term should be 
unenforceable because of the plaintiff’s poor eyesight; the Seventh Circuit 
noted that “it is no defense to say, ‘I did not read what I was signing.’”36 In 
still another case, mortgage borrowers who discovered that their agreement 
contained an adjustable rate that they did not apprehend before signing 
were held liable; the court reasoned “[t]hat the plaintiffs did not read any of 
these documents does not place culpability on the defendant.”37 In sum, 
whether or not a party has read the contract is usually irrelevant to the 
determination of mutual assent. 
What is required is that parties have some notice of the terms—an 
“opportunity to read.”38 If a contract term is “hidden,” a court may refuse to 
enforce it on the grounds that the parties did not manifest their assent.39 In 
Specht v. Netscape, for example, then-Judge Sotomayor confirmed that a party 
must have actual or constructive notice of a term in order for the term to be 
enforceable.40 Parties are deemed to consent to terms they have reason to 
know exist, but firms must give parties reason to know of the terms.41 In 
 
 32. Matthews, supra note 4, at 6871 (including universal default provisions among credit card 
practices targeted by the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009). 
 33. See Perman, supra note 5 (detailing different forms of banking fees that catch 
consumers by surprise). 
 34. See Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 
111-24, § 101(b), 123 Stat. 1734, 1736. 
 35. Leonard v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 499 F.3d 419, 439 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 36. Heller Fin., Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., 883 F.2d 1286, 1292 (7th Cir. 1989). 
 37. Strong v. Option One Mortg. Corp. (In re Strong), 356 B.R. 121, 144 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 
2004), aff’d, Nos. 01-35854BIF, 02-626, 04-CV-4699, 2005 WL 1463245 (E.D. Pa. June 20, 2005). 
 38. See Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that 
an online contract provision was unenforceable because defendants “did not provide 
reasonable notice of the license terms”). 
 39. Robert A. Hillman, Debunking Some Myths About Unconscionability: A New Framework for 
U.C.C. Section 2-302, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 10–12 (1981). 
 40. Specht, 306 F.3d at 35. 
 41. Even this is not always clear; Judge Easterbrook argued in Gateway that the parties had 
to think more terms were coming, even if they did not have any explicit notice from the 
company that that was so. See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 1997). 
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general, however, courts will enforce hidden terms as long as the party has 
some means to exit the contract when the term is revealed, even if doing so 
is burdensome and unlikely.42 
Scholarly acknowledgment of non-readership has had periodic effects 
on contract doctrine, although the effects have not always been long lasting. 
The main effect has been the push to expand the requirement of notice to 
include the content of the terms.43 The argument for this move is that 
consumers are generally on notice that a given contract includes some kinds 
of terms and not others. To this end, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
adopted section 211, affirming the general duty to read, but carving out an 
exception when “the other party has reason to believe that the party 
manifesting such assent would not do so if he knew” of the unread provision 
in question.44 The comment to the Restatement explicitly acknowledges the 
reality of standardized agreements: 
Customers do not in fact ordinarily understand or even read the 
standard terms. They trust to the good faith of the party using the 
form and to the tacit representation that like terms are being 
accepted regularly by others similarly situated. But they understand 
that they are assenting to the terms not read or not understood, 
subject to such limitations as the law may impose.45 
The Restatement approach is in accord with the doctrine of “reasonable 
expectations,”46 which has also had sporadic influence since Friedrich 
Kessler’s 1943 proposal that the terms of form contracts be ignored in favor 
of the consumer’s “reasonable expectations.”47 The proposition that courts 
should attend to the contract that consumers reasonably believe they are 
signing remains viable in a few contracts contexts, insurance most notably.48 
In most contracts contexts, courts have rejected the reasonable 
expectations doctrine, which means that the primary judicial tool for 
scrutiny of unfair terms is the doctrine of unconscionability.49 The 
unconscionability inquiry requires both procedural and substantive 
unfairness, and the relationship between the two is commonly understood as 
a sliding scale, where “the more substantively oppressive the contract term, 
 
 42. See Weaver v. Am. Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d 144, 148 (Ind. 1971) (holding that a hold 
harmless clause, hidden and unexplained to the plaintiff, was not enforceable). 
 43. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1981). 
 44. Id. § 211(3). 
 45. Id. § 211 cmt. b. 
 46. Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L. 
REV. 961, 967 (1970). 
 47. Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 
COLUM. L. REV. 629, 637 (1943). 
 48. See, e.g., W. David Slawson, Contractual Discretionary Power: A Law to Prevent Deceptive 
Contracting by Standard Form, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 853, 858–62. 
 49. See id. at 863.  
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the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to come to the 
conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa.”50 Procedural 
unconscionability asks whether a consumer has had an opportunity to read 
and understand the terms.51 Courts typically require that a party’s duty to 
read be met with an opportunity to read.52 In Williams v. Walker-Thomas, for 
example, the court ruled that the question of consent must be resolved with 
reference to each party’s “reasonable opportunity to understand the terms 
of the contract” and considering the “maze of fine print and . . . deceptive 
sales practices.”53 
In modern academic debates, clearly egregious substantive 
unconscionability is easier to define than procedural unconscionability—
when a term is really shocking, it is often barred by statute54 or subject to 
heightened judicial scrutiny under the common law of contracts (for 
example, exculpatory clauses or penalty clauses). Like other scholars 
grappling with the meaning of consent to standard terms, the focus of my 
argument is on terms that may raise some fairness concerns in the context of 
contracts of adhesion—non-salient fees, arbitration clauses, forum-selection 
clauses, and limitations on firm liability—but almost certainly do not raise a 
plausible defense of unconscionability. The vast majority of terms that 
consumers receive and do not read are nonetheless enforceable. This is the 
challenge for legal scholars who want to support the continued vitality of 
consent in contract theory but nonetheless acknowledge the day-to-day 
reality of modern contracting. 
C. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
Contracts scholars have not been silent on the question of non-
readership and consent. There are three primary defenses that support 
enforcing consent to boilerplate. 
The first defense argues that what really matters is reasonable notice 
that terms exist, and that the role of the terms themselves is purely formal. 
Robert Hillman, writing in support of the American Law Institute’s 
disclosure-of-terms strategy for standardized online contracts, argues that 
what matters is the “opportunity to read.”55 Hillman asserts that this notion is 
 
 50. Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal. 2000). 
 51. See generally 8 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 28, § 18:10. 
 52. Sw. Adm’rs, Inc. v. Rozay’s Transfer, 791 F.2d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 1986) (“‘Fraud in the 
execution’ arises when a party executes an agreement ‘with neither knowledge nor reasonable 
opportunity to obtain knowledge of its character or its essential terms.’” (quoting U.C.C. § 3-
305(2)(c))). 
 53. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
 54. See, e.g., 205 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 675/8.5(e) (LexisNexis 2013) (barring universal 
default clauses in contracts for credit). 
 55. Robert A. Hillman & Maureen O’Rourke, Defending Disclosure in Software Licensing, 78 
U. CHI. L. REV. 95, 105 (2011). 
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consistent with justifications of enforcement in other legal domains.56 “A 
fundamental tenet of the rule of law is reasonable notice,” he argues.57 
“[W]e all know that people rarely read criminal statutes or understand many 
of the intricacies of rules governing even those wrongs of which they are 
aware, such as murder or theft. The point is that people could gain access to 
these materials, which legitimizes the rules as law.”58 On this view, 
readership is unnecessary for disclosure to serve its normative function 
within the doctrinal structure. As long as disclosure is “inexpensive and, at 
worst, harmless,”59 it is a justifiable regulatory approach because it 
legitimizes the imputation of consent. 
The second defense of enforcing boilerplate contends that consumers 
do consent to boilerplate, insofar as they consent to be bound by the terms 
of the deal, knowing that they are not aware of what those terms are. 
Subjective consent to unread terms is a coherent possibility under a broader 
view of consent. Karl Llewellyn has argued for an inference of “blanket 
assent” to the non-bargained-for terms.60 Llewellyn argues that consumers 
assent “to any not unreasonable or indecent terms . . . which do not alter or 
eviscerate the reasonable meaning of the dickered terms.”61 Similarly, Randy 
Barnett’s influential articulation of contractual consent argues that consent 
means a manifestation of an intention to be legally bound.62 According to 
this view, all that matters is agreeing to the deal, whatever the deal may 
hold—much like we think that people ought to be free to assent to take a 
risk or to be surprised, they are free to bind themselves to contracts that they 
do not read. This view of consent has become increasingly influential and 
widely accepted, and, indeed, it is compatible with much of contract 
doctrine. For example, a broad view of consent does not require that a 
person actually read his or her contract—it requires only that he sign it (or 
otherwise objectively manifest assent).63 Barnett and Llewellyn support this 
approach, but note that it requires some kind of doctrinal backstop—thus 
 
 56. See id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 105−06. 
 59. Id. at 107. 
 60. LLEWELLYN, supra note 9, at 370. Wayne Barnes offers a twist on this view, analogizing 
contract formation to voting. In Barnes’s view, a contract has known (read) and unknown 
(unread) terms. He argues that in the political process, it is not controversial at all to bind 
citizens to the decisions of legislators who make choices that were not known or even 
foreseeable by voters at the time of election. Like elected officials, firms desire to be re-elected; 
like terms of office, contracts are time delimited. Like impeachment, unconscionability 
provides relief in the rare instance of truly outrageous behavior. See Wayne Barnes, Consumer 
Assent to Standard Form Contracts and the Voting Analogy, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 839, 842–43 (2010). 
 61. LLEWELLYN, supra note 9, at 370. 
 62. Randy E. Barnett, Contract Is Not Promise; Contract Is Consent, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 647, 
655 (2012). 
 63. See, e.g., 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 3.7 (3d ed. 2004) 
(describing the doctrine of objective consent in the context of non-readership).  
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their visions of broad consent to the unread deal rely in part on a 
background requirement of reasonable expectations or at least a robust 
doctrine of unconscionability.64 
Finally, the third view holds that the absence of meaningful consent is 
unproblematic because market forces will prevent unwanted terms. The 
economic argument in favor of enforcement is that market forces will do 
what individuals would have done, so actual consent is not the problem we 
might think it is.65 In a functioning market in which buyers are reading and 
comparing terms, sellers who offer worse terms will lose customers to sellers 
offering better terms, so sellers will offer efficient terms. Even if only a 
fraction of consumers reads and shops for terms, the non-readers may 
benefit from the minority of informed consumers, whose choices affect the 
firm’s selection of terms.66 In a competitive market, firms will offer terms 
that buyers prefer, in the sense that any requirement of more consumer-
friendly terms will be costly for firms and, in turn, costly for consumers. 
These three arguments are essentially normative justifications for 
enforcing unread terms. These arguments assert that what matters is the 
notice of terms rather than the readership (opportunity to read), a broad 
rather than a narrow consent (blanket assent), and the efficiency of market-
tested terms rather than the fairness of any particular term or contract 
(economic efficiency). In the next Part, I present the existing literature on 
the psychology of the fine print—why consumers do not read it, and how 
they understand their obligations under it. 
II. PSYCHOLOGY OF BOILERPLATE 
In this Part, I set up one of my central claims: that most consumers are 
deeply ambivalent about consent to form contracts. First, I identify two 
arguably dissonant strands of psychological research in this area: the 
cognitive psychology literature explaining why most people do not 
deliberate carefully over the fine print, and the moral psychology literature 
suggesting that most people view their contractual agreements as serious 
moral obligations. This Part concludes with the first experimental study of 
this Essay, documenting how these conflicting views play out in a simplified 
contracts scenario. 
 
 64. See Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 627, 630–31 
(2002) (discussing a market-based justification for form contracts); Goldman, supra note 27, at 
715–16 (same). 
 65. See generally Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of 
Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630 (1979). 
 66. Id. at 637–39. 
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A. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF IGNORING FINE PRINT 
Melvin Aron Eisenberg has argued that concerns about form contracts 
“rest ultimately on the limits of cognition.”67 There are two sets of worries 
about cognitive limits—one that is easy to deal with and one that is the 
subject of this Essay. The easy worry is that some contract terms are hard to 
understand because they are so complicated, jargon-filled, illegible, or 
otherwise confusing on their face that they are truly difficult for most people 
to understand. These are true “readability” problems,68 like the one in 
Williams v. Walker-Thomas, where a pro rata term in a layaway agreement was 
so opaque that it would be unreasonable to expect parties without advanced 
education to understand the financial risk entailed by each new purchase.69 
Although these are sometimes hard problems from a policy perspective, they 
are not all that complicated conceptually; most information can be conveyed 
in plain language and in a readable font. 
Instead, the problem for this discussion is terms that are 
comprehensible and visible but routinely ignored. As Eisenberg and others 
have argued, this problem is conceptually difficult because market forces not 
only fail to protect consumers, but actually force firms to exploit their 
customers’ limited attentional resources in order to survive.70 Humans have 
limited processing capacity and limited attentional resources, and many 
legal scholars have argued against regulation-by-disclosure on these 
grounds.71 Because most decision-making is affected by “bounded 
rationality, optimistic disposition, systematic underestimation of risks, and 
undue weight on the present as compared with the future,”72 standard terms 
in form contracts are systematically overlooked and underestimated. 
Behavioral contracts literature has attempted to address parties’ 
systematic disregard of standard terms by suggesting that courts distinguish 
between salient and non-salient terms73 and give the salience of the terms 
legal relevance. Salient terms like price can be left to market discipline,74 but 
 
 67. Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 240. 
 68. See, e.g., Ronald J. Mann, “Contracting” for Credit, 104 MICH. L. REV. 899, 903–04 (2006). 
 69. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965).  
 70. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373, 1373 (2004) 
(“Absent legal intervention, the sophisticated seller will often exploit the consumer’s behavioral 
biases. . . . Such biased contracting is not the consequence of imperfect competition. On the 
contrary, competitive forces compel sellers to take advantage of consumers’ weaknesses.”). 
 71. See, e.g., Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 8. 
 72. Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 241. 
 73. See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and 
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1225 (2003) (“[P]roduct attributes that are 
evaluated, compared, and implicitly priced as part of the purchase decision [are] ‘salient’ 
attributes and product attributes that are not evaluated, compared, and priced as part of the 
purchase decision [are] ‘non-salient’ attributes.”). 
 74. See, e.g., Victor P. Goldberg, Institutional Change and the Quasi-Invisible Hand, 17 J.L. & 
ECON. 461, 485 (1974) (arguing that competition is based on price and not other terms). 
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courts ought to scrutinize non-salient terms that consumers will ignore.75 
When terms require people to take into account low-probability events76 or 
calculate the effects of small, disaggregated fees,77 for example, consumers 
are less likely to consider the consequences of the terms or factor them into 
a cost–benefit analysis of the transaction. Psychological research suggests 
that it is not only that terms are difficult or time-consuming to read, but also 
that people have limited attentional resources and will overlook non-salient 
features of any transaction. The psychological approach to fine print argues 
that there are cognitive explanations for why consumers do not deliberate 
over fine-print terms, and these cognitive explanations ought to make us 
cautious about construing consent to those terms. 
B. MORAL OBLIGATION OF CONTRACT 
We do, and indeed must, ignore scores of fine-print terms every day. 
Nonetheless, a considerable body of evidence shows that most people take 
their contractual obligations very seriously. Studies from behavioral decision 
research, including experimental contracts research, document a strong 
norm of promise keeping—in the contracts context, a norm of 
performance. For over 50 years, scholars have been collecting evidence of 
an intuitive moral theory of contract that neither existing contract law nor 
straightforward economic incentives can easily explain.78 People take 
contracts very seriously and regard their promissory obligations as moral 
commitments. In questionnaire studies, participants report that breach of 
contract is immoral.79 They prefer to avoid breach of contract, even when 
breach is more profitable than performance.80 Participants indicate that 
breach should be punished with damages above expectation levels, and that 
harms resulting from breach of contract should be punished more heavily 
than identical harms resulting from negligence in tort.81 And many people 
report a preference for specific performance as a default remedy for breach 
 
 75. See Korobkin, supra note 73, at 1207. 
 76. See id. at 1231–32 (arguing that underweighting of small risks and overconfidence may 
contribute to the low salience of terms addressing low-probability events). 
 77. See Peter A. Alces & Jason M. Hopkins, Carrying a Good Joke Too Far, 83 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 879, 889–90 (2008) (“Banks that engage in ‘shrouding’ effectively hide the true cost of 
contracting. So customers making the initial purchase decision, i.e., opening the checking 
account, may not consider shrouded attributes such as maintenance costs and hidden fees for 
account-related services.” (footnote omitted)). 
 78. See, e.g., Macaulay, supra note 20, at 60 (finding that Wisconsin businessmen believed 
that their contract obligations were supported by moral obligations). 
 79. Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Jonathan Baron, Moral Judgment and Moral Heuristics in Breach of 
Contract, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 405 (2009). 
 80. But see Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Do Liquidated Damages Encourage Breach? A Psychological 
Experiment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 633, 659 (2010) (reporting the results of an experiment in which 
participants indicated greater willingness to breach a contract that included a liquidated 
damages clause than one that did not). 
 81. Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron, supra note 79, at 417–20. 
E2_WILKINSON-RYAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/10/2014  11:35 AM 
2014] A PSYCHOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF CONSENT TO FINE PRINT 1761 
of contract, even when the value of the performance in question is easily 
measured in dollars.82 
Furthermore, we have some experimental and real-world evidence that 
people honor the terms of contracts that appear quite unfair. One of the 
recent puzzles for economists is that so many homeowners are currently 
underwater (owing more on their mortgages than their homes are worth), 
and yet relatively few of these underwater homeowners strategically 
default.83 Surveys of homeowners and experimental questionnaire studies 
both offer evidence that homeowners do not walk away from their 
mortgages because they consider their loan obligations to be morally 
binding contracts.84 
It may seem intuitive that these strong views of contract morality would 
not apply to form contracts, but the evidence on this is quite mixed. Some 
studies have identified differences between perceptions of negotiated and 
non-negotiated contracts and mounted strong arguments that people 
distinguish between them, on moral and practical grounds. The same is true 
for known and unknown terms. However, at least one study on the 
commonsense moral attitude toward standard-form contracting shows that 
when contract terms are clear and unambiguous, questionnaire participants 
report that breach of a standard form contract is no less morally problematic 
than breach of a negotiated contract.85 Subjects in that study reported that 
in the event that a term is clear, enforcement should not depend on the 
term’s provenance (negotiation or boilerplate).86 Similarly, Zev Eigen has 
found that reminding the subjects of their moral obligation is the most 
effective way to secure performance—even for terms embedded in lengthy 
boilerplate contracts.87 
It should not be surprising that evidence on form contracts is mixed, 
because the social norms of contract appear quite ambiguous. On the one 
hand, there is a pervasive rhetoric around the idea of “keeping your word.” 
On the other hand, most ordinary consumers live in a world in which 
contract formation is hasty by design, often completed with the explicit 
understanding that it is a meaningless formality.88 What do terms that are 
 
 82. Id. at 413–14. 
 83. See Luigi Guiso et al., Moral and Social Constraints to Strategic Default on Mortgages 2–3, 9–
12 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15145, 2009), available at http:// 
www.nber.org/papers/w15145.pdf?new_window=1. 
 84. Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Breaching the Mortgage Contract: The Behavioral Economics of Strategic 
Default, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1547 (2011). 
 85. Yuval Feldman & Doron Teichman, Are All Contractual Obligations Created Equal?, 100 
GEO. L.J. 5, 30 (2011). 
 86. Id. at 27–30. 
 87. Zev J. Eigen, When and Why Individuals Obey Contracts: Experimental Evidence of Consent, 
Compliance, Promise, and Performance, 41 J. LEGAL STUD. 67, 88 (2012). 
 88. Cf. Shmuel I. Becher, Behavioral Science and Consumer Standard Form Contracts, 68 LA. L. 
REV. 117, 125 (2007) (arguing that sellers take advantage of various psychological phenomena 
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available only via a click-through, or as part of a multi-page agreement 
presented at checkout while a line of other customers waits, say about the 
sanctity of a contract? Most people get mixed messages about how seriously 
they are supposed to be taking these contracts. The goal of Study 1, below, is 
to start to document how consumers understand these mixed messages. 
C. JUDGING CONSUMER CONSENT 
The first study tries to address in a systematic way the tension observed 
in the existing psychology literature. The study question is how people take 
the information about limited capacity for reading terms and use it to 
inform their inferences of consumer consent and culpability for 
transactional harms. In order to test the role of contracting procedures on 
judgments of assent and enforcement, the subjects were randomly assigned 
to read about a readable contract (2 pages) and an unreadable contract (15 
pages). 
1. Study 1: Blame and the Reasonable Consumer 
a. Method 
The goal of the first study is to explore attitudes about consumer 
consent. Because the studies in this Essay rely on similar methods, I explain 
the methodology in detail here and then refer to the methods in a more 
shorthand way in subsequent studies. These studies tested a series of 
propositions about beliefs and judgments of consumer consent with short 
vignette experiments. Generally, this methodology asked subjects to 
consider hypothetical contracts scenarios and answer questions to report 
their reactions and assessments. In each study, subjects were randomly 
assigned to see one of two versions of a scenario, such that a variable of 
interest may be tested experimentally. Subjects were drawn from one of two 
adult subject pools: Amazon Mechanical Turk89 or a proprietary pool of 
online survey-takers who have signed up through the University of 
 
when they present consumers with standard form contracts at the end of the transaction, 
increasing “the chances that consumers will not carefully examine the contract they enter”). 
 89. Amazon Mechanical Turk is an online platform that permits people to sign up as 
workers and perform short tasks for small amounts of money. It has been widely used for 
surveys and questionnaire experiments. Subjects are recruited via a short online posting 
offering between $0.50 and $1.50 to answer questions for research. After the pre-specified 
number of subjects have completed the survey, the task link is disabled on Amazon. Growing 
evidence supports the use of this sample; indeed, U.S. workers on Mechanical Turk are 
arguably closer to the U.S. population as a whole than subjects recruited from traditional 
university subject pools. See Gabriele Paolacci, Jesse Chandler & Panagiotis G. Ipeirotis, Running 
Experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk, 5 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 411, 411 (2010). 
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Pennsylvania. The particular subject pool is noted in the Methods section of 
each study.90 
Study 1 asked how judgments of consumer and firm behavior at the 
time of contract formation affect attributions of consent and blame at the 
time of enforcement. In order to experimentally manipulate the variable of 
interest here (attributes of contract formation), I tested a scenario 
describing a hidden fee in a credit card contract, randomly assigning 
subjects to read about either a short or a long set of terms: 
Kevin has recently purchased a credit card. He shopped around to 
find a card that meets his main preferences, including a low 
interest rate and high bonus points to build frequent flyer miles. 
When his application is approved, he receives the new card in the 
mail along with a [2-page] [15-page] contract that goes with such 
cards. The contract between a customer and a credit card company 
does not begin until the customer calls and activates the card. He 
activates the card without reading the contract, and the next 
month finds that the terms included information about the $5 fee 
charged for paying the bill online. This was how Kevin had planned 
to pay his bill. Kevin is unhappy. Please indicate your agreement 
with the statements below. 
Subjects were then asked to indicate their agreement with a set of 
statements, on a 1 to 7 scale where 1 was “strongly disagree,” 4 was “neither 
agree nor disagree,” and 7 was “strongly agree.” 
(1) Kevin is to blame for this problem. 
(2) It is reasonable to expect Kevin to read a [2-page][15-page] 
contract. 
(3) Companies should explain fees in ways other than the clause in 
the form contract. 
(4) Kevin consented to this fee. 
(5) Hidden fees like this should be banned. 
 
 90. In the University of Pennsylvania’s Proprietary Pool, subjects were recruited over a ten-
year period, mostly through their own efforts at searching for ways to earn money by 
completing questionnaires. Approximately 90% of respondents were U.S. residents (with the 
rest mostly from Canada). The panel is roughly representative of the adult U.S. population in 
terms of income, age, and education, but not in terms of sex, because (for unknown reasons) 
women predominate in this respondent pool. For each study, an email was sent to about 500 
members of the panel, saying how much the study paid and where to find it on the World Wide 
Web. Each study was a series of separate web pages, programmed in JavaScript. The first page 
provided brief instructions. Each of the others presented a case, until the last, which asked for 
(optional) comments and sometimes contained additional questions. Each case had a space for 
optional comments. Otherwise the subject had to answer all questions to proceed. 
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Each subject saw both versions of the scenario, but the order was 
assigned randomly to permit between-subjects analysis of the first question 
only. One hundred subjects participated in the study via Amazon 
Mechanical Turk. They were paid $0.75 each for participation in a two-
minute survey. Ages ranged from 18 to 65 with a median age of 29; 60% of 
subjects were male. 
b. Results 
Figure 1 documents the mean differences for each of the five variables 
identified above. Subjects in the Long condition thought that it was 
significantly less reasonable to expect the consumer to read the contract 
than subjects in the Short condition.91 In other words, the length of the 
contract shifted the balance from one side of the scale (reasonable) to the 
other (unreasonable).92 In the Long condition, 34% of the subjects thought 
that it was reasonable (5 to 7 on the scale) to expect the consumer to read; 
in the Short condition, 76% thought reading was a reasonable expectation. 
Figure 1. Mean Agreement, on Scale of 1 to 7, with Statements About 
Consumer Behavior and Disclosure Policy, in Short and Long Conditions. 
 
 
None of the other between-subjects differences were statistically 
significant. This means that subjects’ judgments of consumer consent and 
consumer blame were essentially unaffected by an otherwise highly salient 
feature of the contract. Even though subjects reported that it is 
unreasonable to expect a consumer to read a 15-page contract, they 
 
 91. Between-subjects comparisons are analyzed with a non-parametric test, which does not 
assume a normal distribution of responses. The Wilcoxon rank-sum test used here tests the 
hypothesis that the median difference between conditions is not zero. 
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nonetheless felt that the non-reading consumer was as responsible for his 
non-readership as the consumer who had only two pages of terms to wade 
through.93 The same was true for judgments of consent; 86% of subjects in 
the Short condition and 82% of subjects in the Long condition agreed (5 to 
7 on the scale) that Kevin consented to the fee.94 
On the other hand, generally subjects were also concerned about the 
company’s role in this transaction—and they were concerned even when the 
contract was short. They overwhelmingly agreed (by selecting 5 to 7 on the 
scale) that the company should find an alternative way to communicate 
information about fees (92% agreed in the Short condition; 96% in the 
Long condition)95 and even tended to agree that hidden fees like these 
should be banned (82% in the Short condition; 88% in the Long 
condition).96 
These results present a picture of ambivalence about consumer 
consent. Respondents clearly believed that using fine print to impose fees on 
consumers is inappropriate—subjects overwhelmingly reported that 
companies should find other ways to inform consumers about fees and many 
subjects thought that hidden fees should be banned altogether. And subjects 
were sensitive to the reality of consumer contracting, indicating that it is 
somewhat unreasonable to expect a consumer to read 15 pages of 
boilerplate. The puzzle, then, is that these beliefs seem entirely 
disconnected from subjects’ equally strong feelings that the non-reading 
consumer consented to the contract and bears the blame for the resulting 
transactional harm. 
The question for the remainder of this Essay is how to explain these 
findings. I propose that subjects’ coherent normative theories of consent 
cannot fully explain these results. These results suggest that when people are 
asked to think about contract formation—how the parties draft and manifest 
their assent to terms—most people are sensitive to the context and are 
generally concerned about boilerplate transacting. But when the question is 
about performance and enforcement, judgment becomes much more stark: 
The consent was real and the consumer is to blame. 
Of course it is possible that consumers take an explicitly strict-liability 
view of contracting. Like the law of contracts, subjects may believe that 
consumers are to blame for their transactional harms insofar as entering any 
transaction entails a certain assumption of risk. In fact, this explanation is 
borne out in the within-subjects results to some extent. Within-subjects 
comparisons ask to what extent the average subject differentiated among the 
 
 93. The mean in Short condition was 5.48; the mean in Long condition was 5.28 
(W=1409, p=.253). 
 94. The mean in Short condition was 5.62; the mean in Long condition was 5.50 
(W=1246.5, p=.983). 
 95. The mean in Short condition was 6.04; the mean in Long condition was 6.06 
(W=1116, p=.322). 
 96. The mean in Short condition was 5.40; the mean in Long condition was 5.86 
(W=1067, p=.154). 
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two conditions—because subjects responded to the scenario in both 
conditions, it is possible to discern their views of the difference between the 
two situations. 
 
Table 1. Within-Subject Differences in Judgments of Long and Short Contracts 
 







The differences in Table 1 show how differently the average subject felt 
about the variables—consent, blame, etc.—given the difference in the 
length of the contract. Each subject read the scenario in both versions. 
Thus, on the second item subjects were really being asked to think about 
how their intuitions about the contract were different when the contract 
length was changed. There were significant differences on every variable. 
Two findings stand out. The first is that when the subjects’ task was one 
of comparison, their blame attributions were more responsive to the 
contract length. Nonetheless, even in this within-subjects comparison in 
which subjects are aware of the variable being tested, the magnitude of the 
difference between scenarios for Blame is much smaller than the difference 
between scenarios for Reasonableness. This means that many subjects 
explicitly, knowingly reported that they would blame a consumer no less for 
having failed to read an admittedly unreasonably long contract. 
Of course, judgments of consumer consent are at least in part founded 
in explicit moral theories of individual autonomy. However, there are also 
implicit psychological processes affecting the differential judgments of 
contract formation and judgments of contract enforcement. What I mean by 
this is that there is evidence from various domains of psychology, which I will 
take up in turn below, that there is something fundamentally different about 
the cognitive processes invoked when people are asked to explain harms. 
Importantly, analysis of contract enforcement requires such an explanation 
of harms. Making attributions of culpability, the underlying judgment task in 
constructing the narrative of a harm, raises a distinct set of cognitions and 
motivations. Different cues are more or less salient, and there is pressure to 
assign blame in a way that does not conflict with an underlying worldview. In 
the next Part, I test the hypothesis that some of the change in stance toward 
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consent attributions is implicit, that the task of judgment is different when 
we are assessing an agreement (contract formation) than a harm 
(enforcement). 
III. MOTIVATION TO IMPUTE CONSENT 
In the face of ambiguous or mixed evidence, our desires often shape 
our beliefs.97 Knowledge of a transactional harm makes attributions of 
consent more psychologically appealing. Psychologists have observed for 
over fifty years that most people, when confronted with information that 
someone has suffered a harm, are motivated to assign blame.98 Not only do 
they want to assign blame, they want to assign blame in a way that is 
psychologically comfortable.99 Study 2 tests the proposition that judgments 
of consumer harms involve motivated reasoning. 
A. CONTRACTING IN A JUST MARKETPLACE 
The study below is patterned on research of a particular manifestation 
of motivated reasoning, referred to as the “just world hypothesis”100 or 
“system justification theory.”101 These terms describe the idea that people 
are uncomfortable with information that threatens to falsify their preferred 
hypothesis that the system we live in is reasonable and fair. We prefer to 
believe that things happen for a reason, and thus that victims of harms 
deserve their fate.102 Legal scholars have observed and discussed this kind of 
motivated blaming in other domains. For example, a strong just world belief 
makes observers more likely to think that victims of sexual harassment or 
sexual assault contributed to their own victimization.103 It increases 
 
 97. See, e.g., Peter H. Ditto & David F. Lopez, Motivated Skepticism: Use of Differential Decision 
Criteria for Preferred and Nonpreferred Conclusions, 63 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 568 (1992) 
(discussing motivated judgment literature and applying it to research illustrating that 
individuals evaluate information consistent with their beliefs less critically when reaching a 
preferred conclusion). 
 98. See, e.g., Melvin J. Lerner & Carolyn H. Simmons, Observer’s Reaction to the “Innocent Victim”: 
Compassion or Rejection?, 4 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 203 (1966) (showing experimentally 
that subjects who were unable to prevent a harm were motivated to derogate the victim). 
 99. Id. 
 100. See generally Melvin J. Lerner & Dale T. Miller, Just World Research and the Attribution 
Process: Looking Back and Ahead, 85 PSYCHOL. BULL. 1030 (1978). 
 101. See generally John T. Jost, Mahzarin R. Banaji & Brian A. Nosek, A Decade of System 
Justification Theory: Accumulated Evidence of Conscious and Unconscious Bolstering of the Status Quo, 25 
POL. PSYCHOL. 881 (2004). 
 102. Aviva Orenstein, No Bad Men!: A Feminist Analysis of Character Evidence in Rape Trials, 49 
HASTINGS L.J. 663, 676 n.50 (1998) (“‘Just world’ theory posits that people have an intense 
psychological need to view the world as a fair place because this perception provides a sense of 
control over their lives. The ‘just world’ theory predicts that people will blame a rape victim to 
maintain the belief that the world is fair, people get what they deserve, and there is a sense of 
order over the environment.” (citation omitted)). 
 103. See Kristen M. Klein et al., Attributions of Blame and Responsibility in Sexual Harassment: 
Reexamining a Psychological Model, 35 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 92, 94 (2011). 
E2_WILKINSON-RYAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/10/2014  11:35 AM 
1768 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:1745 
attributions of blameworthiness in criminal prosecutions,104 and it may help 
explain how jurors determine causation in torts cases.105 I propose that the 
just world belief also has bite in the transactional context. 
Study 2 predicts that endorsement of strict liability for objective 
manifestations of consumer consent, whether in a given case or as a default 
stance in contracts more generally, fits nicely into a theory of the world in 
which individual agents interact with a fair and orderly marketplace. The 
idea that the harm is attributable to the consumer’s consent is 
psychologically appealing. In order to find out whether the fact of harm has 
an independent effect on attributions of consent, Study 2 asks subjects to 
evaluate assent to a form contract in light of various details about the 
transaction and the context. Although subjects were asked to assess assent, 
half of them had information about a negative outcome of the transaction. 
The hypothesis is that subjects who know that the transaction has ended 
badly for the consumer will be more likely to believe that the consumer 
consented to the contract than subjects who learn about the consent process 
but not the outcome. 
1. Study 2: Effect of Harm on Attributions of Consent 
a. Method 
This study tested the hypothesis that subjects would be more willing to 
conclude that a consumer consented to an unread, unfavorable term if they 
learned that the term had in fact affected the consumer. Subjects were 
randomly assigned to either the Control condition or the Harm condition. 
Each subject read two scenarios, one describing a homeowners insurance 
policy and the other describing a new car warranty. Subjects in the Harm 
condition also read a short description of the term’s negative effect on the 
consumer. In order to minimize the possibility that subjects would be more 
likely to attribute consent to unfavorable terms to consumers engaging in 
risky behavior, the consumer’s behavior is described as being relatively 
routine, even cautious, and the property damage results from the negligent 
or intentional act of a third party. The scenarios read as follows: 
Insurance Policy: 
George is a single 32 year-old restaurant manager. He lives in a 
small Midwestern city with his two dogs. George purchased a 
homeowners insurance policy when he recently bought a 
condominium in a renovated factory downtown. To get insurance, 
George met with an insurance agent who gave him the rates for 
different levels of coverage, promising to send the complete list of 
terms once the deal was done. George chose a mid-level plan 
 
 104. Donald A. Dripps, Fundamental Retribution Error: Criminal Justice and the Social Psychology 
of Blame, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1383, 1428 (2003). 
 105. Jon Hanson & Michael McCann, Situationist Torts, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1345, 1369–71 
(2008). 
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(neither the cheapest nor the most expensive). He signed up for a 
payment plan and signed the policy contract. A week later, he 
received a “welcome packet” from his insurance company, 
including a ten-page document specifying the details of the policy. 
George did not read the policy details, but kept a copy for his files. 
Policyholders are permitted to cancel coverage or switch plans at 
any time. 
One of the terms of George’s policy, explained under the heading 
“Personal Valuables,” is that the insurance company will not cover 
personal items valued at over $5000 unless the homeowner has 
already notified the insurance company that such items are in the 
home prior to the damage or loss. George has a small collection of 
valuable baseball cards, four of which are valued at over $10,000 
each. He plans to sell the cards within the year. 
Harm Condition: 
George stores his baseball cards in a cabinet in his home office in 
his condominium. One morning, a plumbing problem in his 
upstairs neighbor’s bathroom causes a big leak in George’s condo, 
right into his home office. Water drips into the cabinet and the 
baseball cards are ruined. 
New Car Warranty: 
Jill is a 40 year-old high school teacher who lives in a suburban 
California neighborhood with her husband and young daughter. 
Jill has recently bought a new car. She shopped around and found 
a well-reviewed car with a good warranty. It came with a twenty-page 
Detailed Warranty in addition to the basic warranty information 
provided at sale (50,000 miles or five years, some restrictions apply, 
see Detailed Warranty for details). Jill did not read the Detailed 
Warranty, provided in the glove compartment of her new vehicle. 
One thing that is not covered is external damage related to 
“vandalism, theft, or other criminal activity.” Jill does not live in a 
dangerous area, but there are reports of petty theft and property 
damage here and there in the local newspaper. 
Harm Condition: 
Jill parks her car in the parking lot of a nearby supermarket. When 
she returns, she finds that her car has been “keyed”—that is, 
someone has used their keys and made a long scratch in the paint 
on the driver’s side doors. 
Subjects either read both scenarios in the control condition (no harm) 
or both scenarios in the harm condition. They were then asked to what 
extent they agreed with four statements, on a seven-point scale from “Totally 
Disagree” at the low end, “Neither Agree nor Disagree” at the midpoint, and 
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“Totally Agree” at the high end. The key question was presented first, and it 
asked: “Think back to Jill’s warranty. To what extent do you agree that Jill 
has consented to the vandalism term?” Subjects were also asked to assess the 
consumer’s responsibility, caution, and likability. 
In this study, 149 Amazon Mechanical Turk subjects were paid $1.50 
each to participate in a five-minute survey online. Ages ranged from 20 to 69 
with a median of 37, and 56.4% of the respondents were women. 
b. Results 
This comparison had one main effect: Subjects were more likely to 
agree that the promisee had consented to the unfavorable term when they 
had information that the term affected the promisee.106 Means are shown in 
Table 2. In general, the trends for the Responsible, Cautious, and Likable 
variables were in the predicted direction (less favorable when the party 
suffers a harm), but none were statistically significant. In other words, a 
party who has suffered a harm is perceived as more likely to have consented 
to that harm than a party who has made similar representations of consent 
but has not been harmed. Or, put differently, subjects were ambivalent 
about the meaning of consent to the unread term until they received 
information that motivated a decision to attribute consent. 
Table 2. Mean Agreement that the Party in Question “Consented to” the 
Unfavorable Term. 
 Control Harm
Insurance Scenario 4.80 5.20
Warranty Scenario 4.66 5.55
 
In this study, the mere fact of a transactional harm changes how 
individuals think about consent. One can imagine an explicit theory (as 
opposed to psychologically motivated reasoning) that justifies the 
disjunction between reasonable expectations of readership and consumer 
blame in Study 1—it might be that we know consumer contracting is 
burdensome but believe that consumers should be held to a high standard 
whenever they voluntarily enter the marketplace. Study 2 does not lend itself 
to this kind of explicit explanation. Subjects were asked to indicate the 
nature of the consumer’s gamble in consent terms; the only difference 
between the consumer in the Control and Harm conditions is that in the 
 
 106. For the Insurance scenario, the difference in Consent values across conditions is 
marginally significant in a two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test (W=2276, p=.053). For the 
Warranty scenario, the difference is highly significant using a two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test 
(W=1871, p=.0005). 
E2_WILKINSON-RYAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/10/2014  11:35 AM 
2014] A PSYCHOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF CONSENT TO FINE PRINT 1771 
Harm case, the consumer has lost his bet. Normatively, knowledge of the 
outcome should not affect the assessment of the decision. 
If the just world hypothesis makes people more likely to attribute 
culpability or complicity to the victims of random violent attacks, it should 
not be surprising that it has purchase in the contracts context. In contract, a 
consumer knowingly consents to be bound to the contents of the contract; 
the cognitive leap is barely noticeable—and indeed easily defensible. Adam 
Benforado has explicitly drawn the connection between the just world belief 
and the derogation of financially struggling consumers, arguing that the 
tendency to blame the victim explains much of the popular rhetoric blaming 
underwater homeowners or borrowers in bankruptcy for their fates.107 If 
feckless consumers are making poor choices, transactional harms are 
consistent with the belief that the marketplace is a reasonable, fair place 
where consumers have control over their deals—and, indeed, this approach 
is probably best for the individual consumer. Consumers should be cautious, 
should seek to understand their high-stakes agreements, and should assume 
that the choices they make matter. The question is whether and how this 
prudential stance ought to affect our judgments of blameworthiness. 
The results of Study 2 suggest that when asked to judge a transactional 
harm, inferences of consumer consent may result from a form of motivated 
reasoning. That is, people prefer to make the judgment, “It’s your fault.” 
Notwithstanding this preference, it seems plausible that this judgment could 
be quite uncomfortable. On the one hand, no one wants to think that the 
system is rigged. Yet, on the other hand, most people are ordinary 
consumers, so blaming consumers for transactional harms places the blame 
on people very much like oneself. In the next experiment, I test the 
proposition that a very well-known psychological bias, the overconfidence 
effect, gives people a way to distance themselves from consumers affected by 
a transactional harm: “It’s your fault—and I’m not like you.” 
B. OVERCONFIDENCE 
There is reason to think that individuals may overestimate their own 
skill and caution in consumer transactions, thus making it easier to blame 
others who do not read their contracts carefully. Broadly speaking, most 
people are motivated to form positive assessments of their own attributes, 
including their own luck. For example, 88% of the general American 
population rates their own driving as safer than the median driver;108 two-
thirds of college professors believe that their teaching is in the top 
 
 107. Adam Benforado, Don’t Blame Us: How Our Attributional Proclivities Influence the 
Relationship Between Americans, Business and Government, 5 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 509, 540–
41 (2010). 
 108. Ola Svenson, Are We All Less Risky and More Skillful Than Our Fellow Drivers?, 47 ACTA 
PSYCHOLOGICA 143, 146 (1981). 
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quartile;109 and roughly 85% of a random sample of residents of New Jersey 
thought that they had “below-average” risk of getting food poisoning.110 
Study 3 predicts that this kind of overconfidence applies to one’s 
consumer activities; many people agree that fine print is problematic but 
overestimate their own skill and caution in the marketplace. 
1. Study 3: Overestimating One’s Own Readership 
This study tests the hypothesis that even though many people believe 
that others are inattentive to their respective contracts, people believe that 
their own likelihood to read contracts is much higher. 
a. Method 
This questionnaire study was conducted with 120 subjects from the 
proprietary University of Pennsylvania subject pool described in Part II.111 
Subjects read short vignettes about contracts and then answered questions 
about them. The study used three core vignettes, each presented in two 
conditions. The vignettes described, respectively, a contract for a new credit 
card, a contract for a home computer, and a car warranty. The two 
conditions were Self and Other. Subjects were asked to answer how much of 
the contract that they would likely read, and how much of the contract that 
the average person would likely read. 
The three scenarios in the Self condition are as follows. The Other 
condition is identical except that it asks subjects to think about “consumers” 
generally.112 
Credit Card Contract: 
Please imagine that you are applying for a new credit card. You 
shop around to find a card that meets your main preferences (low 
interest rate, good bonus features, easy to pay bill and redeem 
points, etc.). Your application for the card is approved, and you 
receive the new card in the mail along with the three-page contract. 
The contract between you and the credit card company does not 




 109. K. Patricia Cross, Not Can, but Will College Teaching Be Improved?, 17 NEW DIRECTIONS 
FOR HIGHER EDUC., Spring 1977, at 10. 
 110. Neil D. Weinstein, Optimistic Biases About Personal Risks, 246 SCIENCE 1232, 1232 (1989). 
 111. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.  
 112. The Other condition of this scenario, for example, read, “Imagine consumers who are 
applying for new credit cards. They shop around to find a card that meets their main 
preferences (low interest rate, good bonus features, easy to pay bill and redeem points, etc.). 
When their applications are approved, they receive the new cards in the mail along with the 
three page contracts that go with such cards. The contract between a customer and a credit 
card company does not begin until the customer calls and activates the card.” 
E2_WILKINSON-RYAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/10/2014  11:35 AM 
2014] A PSYCHOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF CONSENT TO FINE PRINT 1773 
Computer Purchase: 
Please imagine that you are purchasing a home desktop computer. 
It costs about $1500. It comes with a set of detailed contract terms, 
approximately six pages. You do not need to sign them, but if you 
do not return the computer within five days of purchase, it is 
understood that you have agreed to the terms and conditions that 
came in the contract that was in the box. 
Car Warranty: 
Please imagine that you are purchasing a new car from a 
dealership. When you buy the car you must deal with the financing, 
the sales agreement, and the warranty. The warranty is their New 
Vehicle Warranty, and it is contained in a short Warranty 
Information Booklet (a five-inch booklet of about 20 pages). The 
booklet’s first page gives a summary of its contents. 
After each vignette, subjects were asked to estimate both the number of 
minutes that they (or the average consumer) would spend reading the 
contract, as well as the percentage of the text that they would read, “either 
carefully or skimming attentively enough to get the gist.” Subjects were 
randomly assigned to complete either all of the Self or all of the Other items 
first, and then all subjects saw the items in the other condition, permitting 
both between- and within-subjects analyses. Order of items within blocks was 
randomized. 
b. Results 
Subjects reported that they would spend more time, and read enough 
to “get the gist” of a greater fraction of the contract, than the average 
consumer reading the same contract.113 Means are reported in Table 3. 
  
 
 113. The between-subject’s Self and Other difference was significant for minutes spent 
reading the credit card contract (t=3.18, df=115.86, p=.004) and estimated percent of credit 
card contract covered (t=5.92, df=115.12, p=.000). The Self and Other difference was 
significantly different for estimated minutes spent reading the computer contract (t=2.95, 
df=105.56, p=.004) and the estimated percent of computer contract read (t=4.54, df=115.68, 
p=.000). The difference was not significant for minutes spent reading the car warranty 
(p=.205), but it was marginally significant for fraction of warranty read (t=1.92, df=118.5, 
p=.057). The subject’s sex did not affect overall differences. Overall, women predicted more 
time reading contracts than men, except in the Car Warranty example. 
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Table 3. Estimated Time Spent Reading Contracts, and Fraction of 
Contracts Read, for Self and for Average Consumer. 
 Self Average Consumer 
Credit Card: Minutes 10.6 6.1
Credit Card: Fraction 65.3% 33.0%
Computer: Minutes 12.4 6.8
Computer: Fraction 56.5% 31.4%
Car Warranty: Minutes 14.2 11.6
Car Warranty: Fraction 54.5% 43.8%
 
In addition to the between-subjects differences reported in the table 
above, there is also a strong within-subjects effect, meaning that a given 
subject reported higher minutes and percentages for Self than for Average 
Consumer.114 
This kind of motivated reasoning facilitates attributions of consent 
when other consumers are harmed, both by supporting the notion that fine 
print is readable (“I would have read it”) and by distancing one’s self from 
the consumervictims. Subjects may believe that they are generally more 
cautious than others and/or that their own disclosure triage process 
prioritizes high-stakes contracts more effectively than others’ processes. In 
either case these are self-serving beliefs. Here, these self-serving beliefs are 
part of the consent attribution psychology. People who believe in their own 
careful reading of boilerplate can feel comfortable blaming others for failing 
to do so. 
In this Part, I have tried to make the case that judgments of 
transactional harms are disconnected from judgments of contract 
formation, in part due to the motivations associated with how we judge 
harms that happen to other people. In the next Part, I consider how 
cognitive heuristics—rules of thumb that individuals use when they do not 
have information about the distribution of outcomes—especially heuristics 
based on salience, might affect judgments of transactional harms. 
 
 114. Subjects thought that they would spend 2.0 minutes more than the average consumer 
reading the credit card contract (t=2.80, df=121, p=.006), 4.7 more minutes reading the 
computer terms (t=3.70, df=120, p=.000), and 3.7 more minutes reading the car warranty 
(t=3.94, df=120, p=.000). Similarly, they thought that they would read 23.7% more of the credit 
card contract than the average consumer (t=8.05, df=121, p=.000), 21.5% more of the 
computer contract (t=7.11, df=121, p=.000), and 15.1% more of the car warranty (t=5.12, 
df=121, p=.000). 
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IV. AVAILABILITY AND SALIENCE IN CAUSAL ATTRIBUTION 
Substantial evidence indicates a shared preference for holding people 
to their contracts, however egregious the terms.115 In this Part, I argue that 
there are psychological processes that contribute to the arguably outsized 
role of any fact of consent in attributions of culpability for transactional 
harms. 
A. COUNTERFACTUAL REASONING 
Making a causal attribution is a psychologically demanding judgment 
task. The psychological study of causation reveals the heavy role of salience 
and availability for these kinds of judgments. For example, the first and last 
event in a chain of causality will receive more attention than those in the 
middle.116 Unlikable people are perceived as playing a greater causal role in 
harmful events than others, even when there is no other evidence of 
differential culpability.117 And events that are under personal control tend to 
be more salient than those that are not.118 Research in this area has found 
that people rely heavily on counterfactual reasoning when they are judging 
harms: “[F]or negative outcomes, counterfactuals are after-the-fact 
realizations of ways that would have been sufficient to prevent the 
outcomes—and especially ways that actors themselves could have prevented 
their misfortunes.”119 
Imagine that we are considering the plight of an underwater 
homeowner facing a sudden increase in the payments on her adjustable-rate 
mortgage loan. Further imagine that this homeowner might have qualified 
for a traditional fixed-rate mortgage, avoiding this problem altogether. One 
natural explanation for the homeowner’s situation is that she failed to avoid 
a very avoidable problem. This theory of social judgment predicts that each 
actual experience evokes “counterfactual alternatives,” and that we 
understand experiences in reference to their un-realized alternatives.120 This 
 
 115. See, e.g., Warren Mueller, Residential Tenants and Their Leases: An Empirical Study, 69 
MICH. L. REV. 247, 27274 (1970) (conducting a study that documented that many participants 
assumed terms in standard-form leases were enforceable when in fact courts had held the terms 
violated public policy). 
 116. See Barbara A. Spellman, Crediting Causality, 126 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 323, 
324–26 (1997) (describing the hypothesis that people assign more causal effect to events that 
happen first and last in the causal chain). 
 117. See, e.g., Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Control and the Psychology of Blame, 126 PSYCHOL. BULL. 
556, 556 (2000) (finding that “evidence concerning the event is reviewed in a manner that 
favors ascribing blame to the person or persons who evoke the most negative affect or whose 
behavior confirms unfavorable expectations”). 
 118. Neal J. Roese, Counterfactual Thinking, 121 PSYCHOL. BULL. 133, 139 (1997). 
 119. Barbara A. Spellman & David R. Mandel, When Possibility Informs Reality: Counterfactual 
Thinking as a Cue to Causality, 8 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 120, 122 (1999). 
 120. Daniel Kahneman & Dale T. Miller, Norm Theory: Comparing Reality to Its Alternatives, 93 
PSYCHOL. REV. 136 (1986). The following is a classic example of counterfactual alternatives: 
Imagine two people rushing to the airport, both of whom get stuck in traffic and arrive 30 
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research predicts that bad outcomes feel more regrettable as it becomes 
easier to imagine how they could have been avoided. The salience of 
different counterfactuals depends on many factors, but some 
counterfactuals are consistently more salient than others. 
Reliance on counterfactuals (sometimes referred to as “norm theory”) 
is an availability heuristic.121 When an event or an attribute is particularly 
salient, it is very easy to call to mind (or very cognitively “available”). 
Furthermore, studies have shown that blame—whether directed at the self 
or others—depends on the salience of the counterfactual.122 
Consumer consent is a causal link that is easy to call to mind. In a 
variety of studies, subjects assigned greater blame to those persons whose 
choices were easier to mentally unwind—that is, the easier it is to imagine 
how someone might have avoided a harm, the easier it is to find them 
responsible for that harm. This has particular purchase in the disclosure 
setting for a number of reasons. Research suggests that the more available 
counterfactual is the one that changes the more obviously controllable and 
mutable elements of the situation—for example, the individual actor’s 
choices rather than the background decisions of a large firm.123 Second, 
more recent occurrences in a series of events evoke counterfactual 
alternatives more strongly and are more likely to be blamed for negative 
outcomes.124 In the world of contract, drafting comes first, and consent later. 
The hypothesis of Study 4 is that when a consumer experiences a 
transactional harm, the consumer’s consent is a very salient link in the chain 
of causation. Whereas the firm’s actions may be diffused and hard to piece 
together, the consumer’s agreement is a single moment, memorialized, 
easily attributable to a single actor. For most individuals, imagining what a 
consumer could do differently is much easier than imagining what a 
company drafting a contract could do differently—we have lots of 
experience with the former and next to none with the latter. 
In the study reported below, the goal was to manipulate the salience of 
the counterfactual, such that either the consumer’s decision to consent or 
the firm’s decision to include the term was more salient. One method of 
testing norm theory predictions is to change the foreground and 
background actors. A common finding in the counterfactual reasoning 
literature is that the salient counterfactual is typically the one that changes 
 
minutes after the flight is scheduled to leave. One is told that his flight left on time, and the 
other that her flight left 25 minutes late, only five minutes before. Almost everyone thinks that 
the person who missed the flight by five minutes is more upset. 
 121. Id. 
 122. In a study of accident victims, for example, victims’ self-blame was predicted by the 
degree to which they believed they could have avoided the accident, even holding causal 
attributions constant. Christopher G. Davis et al., Self-Blame Following a Traumatic Event: The Role 
of Perceived Avoidability, 22 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 557, 56265 (1996). 
 123. Roese, supra note 118, at 139. 
 124. Dale T. Miller & Saku Gunasegaram, Temporal Order and the Perceived Mutability of 
Events: Implications for Blame Assignment, 59 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1111, 1111 (1990). 
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the behavior of the “protagonist” or the foreground actor.125 In order to test 
the role of counterfactual thinking, subjects in this study were randomly 
assigned to read about a firm’s drafting decision as a background state or as 
a recent decision. A decision is easier to mentally unwind than a background 
state, so this study’s hypothesis is that culpability attributions would shift 
toward the firm in the decision condition. 
1. Study 4: Making Firm Behavior More Salient 
I predicted that the natural reading of consumer contracts scenarios is 
that firm behavior is taken as a given, as background, whereas the consumer 
decisions are easy to mentally unwind. However, it is possible to make firm 
choice more salient by highlighting the possibility that firm behavior is not 
immutable by couching the firm’s inclusion of the unfavorable term in 
active language. 
a. Method 
Respondents to this scenario were drawn from two online pools of adult 
subjects.126 Their responses are collapsed for this analysis. 
Subjects were asked to read the following scenario and answer follow-up 
questions. Subjects in the control group read: 
Ben purchases an item from an online retailer he has never used 
before. Soon afterward, he starts receiving two to four letters a day 
from mortgage and credit card lenders, offering to open new lines 
of credit for him. He is annoyed, and looks to figure out how his 
name got on these mailing lists. He soon finds that it was the online 
purchase he made. The company’s default policy is to share 
customer addresses with “affiliated businesses.” Details of the 
privacy policy were described on a pop-up screen accessible by a 
link next to the “I agree to Terms and Conditions” button. Ben 
clicked the “Agree” button without clicking through to the privacy 
policy page. Indicate your agreement with the statements below. 
Subjects in the Active Firm (norm) group read the same scenario, 
except the sentence about the company’s default policy was changed to 
read, “The company recently changed its default privacy policy and it now 
shares customer addresses with ‘affiliated businesses.’” 
 
 125. Ruth M.J. Byrne & Vittorio Girotto, Cognitive Processes in Counterfactual Thinking, in 
HANDBOOK OF IMAGINATION AND MENTAL SIMULATION 151, 151–52 (Keith D. Markman et al. 
eds., 2009). 
 126. One hundred and ten subjects from the Penn proprietary subject pool were paid 
$1.50 to complete a five-minute survey. One hundred and two subjects participated via Amazon 
Mechanical Turk. They were paid $1 for participating in the five-minute study. There were no 
significant differences in patterns of responses by subject pool, so their data were collapsed for 
analysis. 
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Each subject was asked to indicate the extent to which the consumer 
was to blame for the disclosure of his address, and the extent to which the 
company was to blame. 
b. Results 
In general, most subjects thought that both the consumer and the 
company were to blame. Responding on a seven-point scale, those in the 
control group assigned average blame to the company at 4.33, and to the 
consumer at 4.83; those in the norm group assessed the company’s blame at 
4.91 and the consumer’s blame at 4.61. 
There were no effects of condition on assessments of consumer blame 
or firm blame. However, the important question here is arguably how 
subjects apportioned blame between consumer and firm. Accordingly, in 
order to test the effect of the scenario, I compared—across conditions—the 
average subject’s differential assignment of blame to consumer and firm. 
There was a significant difference—making the firm’s behavior more salient 
changed how subjects ranked the blameworthiness of the parties. 
Specifically, the average subject in the control group thought that the 
consumer was about a half-point (.49 on a seven-point scale) more 
blameworthy than the firm; the average subject in the norm group thought 
that the firm was slightly (.3 points) more culpable than the consumer.127 
To the extent that narratives of transactional harm focus on the choices 
of the consumer (e.g., should the consumer have signed the contract or 
not), the framing of the problem tends to make the consumer’s choice set 
highly salient and the firm’s role apparently a fait accompli. Unless 
participants are prompted to think about the firm’s drafting process as a set 
of choices, the drafter’s role is not a salient factor in judgments of blame. 
Inquiries into consumer consent are about the consumer’s decisions 
against a set of background facts, including the contracts of adhesion that 
consumers encounter. In the last study of this Essay, I turn to one additional 
background reality of consumer decision-making that is often overlooked in 
judgments of consent and transactional harms: reading terms in a context of 
disclosure overload. 
B. INATTENTION TO OVERLOAD: ITEM BRACKETING 
One of the challenges of thinking about disclosure policies is that 
individual policies are considered separately, and each one sounds like a 
plausible solution for informing consumers. In the aggregate, though, the 
myriad disclosures become overwhelming. This is precisely the kind of 
situation in which behavioral researchers have observed the effects of 
“choice bracketing.”128 Choice bracketing research shows that people make 
different decisions when choices are presented in a broad bracket—all 
decisions made together—than they do when the decisions are made in a 
 
 127. W=6045.5, p=.043. 
 128. Daniel Read et al., Choice Bracketing, 19 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 171, 171–72 (1999). 
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narrow bracket—decisions made serially.129 Broad bracketing often leads to 
higher-utility choices because it permits people to consider the 
interdependent consequences of a particular plan or action.130 Study 5 tests 
the proposition that failure to read standard terms is deemed less 
blameworthy when subjects are reminded of the disclosure-full marketplace. 
1. Study 5: Salience of Disclosure Overload 
This study tests the hypothesis that disclosure overload is not a naturally 
salient feature of the consent judgment, but that subjects will be less likely to 
blame non-reading consumers for transactional harms when the study 
scenario makes the context of disclosure overload more salient. 
a. Method 
The hypothesis of the study was that support for disclosure regimes 
would weaken when subjects were prompted to think about the number of 
disclosures that an average American citizen encounters each day. Subjects 
were randomly assigned to a Control condition or a Prompt condition. 
Subjects in the Prompt condition saw the following item before moving to 
the policy questions: 
Disclosures can include everything from information about 
changes in your insurance policy to a list of a drug’s side effects you 
see in an ad for prescription medication to the FBI warning at the 
beginning of a DVD movie you’ve bought. Please estimate the 
number of disclosure statements that the average person 
encounters in a single day. 
Participants were then asked to consider three situations in which 
consumers were surprised by an adverse term in a warranty or disclosure. 
They read as follows: 
Privacy Policy: 
Ben purchases an item from an online retailer. Soon afterward, he 
starts receiving two to four letters a day from mortgage and credit 
card lenders, offering to open new lines of credit for him. He is 
annoyed, and looks to figure out how his name got on these 
mailing lists. He soon finds that it was the online purchase he 
made, which had a privacy policy next to it informing him that they 
would share his name and address with “affiliates.” He had not read 





 129. Id. at 172–73. 
 130. Id. 
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Car Warranty: 
Greg has recently bought a new car. It comes with a 20-page 
Detailed Warranty in addition to the basic warranty information 
provided at sale (50,000 miles or five years, some restrictions apply, 
see Detailed Warranty for details). Six months after purchase, 
Greg’s car is briefly submerged in water after a flash flood makes a 
small pond in his driveway, a highly unusual occurrence in his area. 
He brings it to the dealer and finds out that flood damage is not 
covered. If his car had been parked in the garage, it would not have 
been affected by the flooding. He had not read the warranty closely 
enough to see the flood provision, which was provided on page 13. 
Credit Card Penalty: 
Jill has a credit card with National Bank. She receives a bill from 
them in the mail every month. Three months ago, her bill included 
an additional flyer, a one-page document with normal type. At the 
top in red letters it said: “Important: New Information About the 
Terms of Your Credit Card Contract.” Among other things, it 
informed customers that the previous policy of interest rate 
increases after three late payments would be amended to permit 
interest rate increases after only two late payments. Jill did not read 
the flyer. While moving from one apartment to another, Jill’s bill 
paying systems get disorganized. She pays her credit card bill late 
two months in a row, paying a small late fee each time. When she 
goes to pay her bill the next month (on time) she sees that her 
interest rate has dramatically increased. She calls the credit card 
company and they point her to the flyer that she did not read. 
After each scenario, subjects were asked to indicate their agreement with 
three statements. The first statement was about the extent to which it is the 
consumer’s responsibility to read the disclosure carefully. The second asked 
to what extent this kind of disclosure was a good policy.131 The third asked 
whether the subjects believed that they would have read the disclosure. 
 
 131. The privacy policy question statement read: “Requiring the company to disclose the 
ways they share information with other companies is a good way to address customer privacy 
concerns.” Car Warranty: “Requiring the company to disclose the flood restriction in the 
warranty is a good way to help consumers compare the sales terms in order to choose the best 
deal on a new car.” Credit Card Penalty: “Requiring the credit card company to send a flyer to 
alert customers to new terms is a good way to prevent the credit card companies from taking 
advantage of borrowers.” 
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b. Results 
The median estimate for the number of disclosures a consumer sees in 
a day was ten; the mean was fifteen.132 
Using a two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test, I compared how responses to 
each question differed by condition.133 Mean differences are reported in 
Table 4. The prompt had consistent effects on the participants’ 
endorsement of the idea that reading the contracts in question was the 
consumer’s responsibility, on the support for the disclosure policy, and on 
participants’ beliefs that, had they been in the consumer’s position, they 
would have read the disclosure or contract. 





I Would Have 
Read It 
Privacy Policy .33 .30 .69 
Car Warranty .21 .37 .34
Credit Card 
Penalty 
.20  .33 .43 
 
The study showed that subjects were less likely to endorse strict 
adherence to constructive consent doctrines in contract when they were 
prompted to think about disclosure overload. 
In sum, this Part presents evidence that consumer choice is a very 
salient feature of how we understand transactional harm. Many people 
would agree that as drafters, firms have control over form contracts that 
individuals do not. And they would also agree that a reasonable person who 
wants to participate in the consumer marketplace must sign many contracts 
without reading the terms. These considerations are arguably central 
features of any judgment of consumer consent, but in an assessment of 
harm, they are much less cognitively available than the consumer’s behavior. 
 
 132. One hundred and twenty-three subjects participated in an online survey via Amazon 
Mechanical Turk. Subjects were paid $1.50 each to participate in a 15-minute survey. Subjects 
were all recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk. Ages ranged from 19 to 69 with a median 
age of 35, and 56.1% of subjects were female. 
 133. Privacy Policy: Responsibility (W=1516, p=.033); Policy (W=1389.5, p=.004); Would 
Read (W=1436, p=.014). Car Warranty: Responsibility (W=1589, p=.073); Policy (W=1411.5, 
p=.007); Would Read (W=1693, p=.244). 
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V. TOWARD A PROCEDURAL JUSTICE OF CONTRACTS 
Together, these studies sketch a picture of the moral psychology of 
consent to fine print. Many subjects reported misgivings about the policy of 
disclosing important terms via fine print, and many expressed uncertainty 
that consent to unread fine print was meaningful consent. The existence of 
disclosures in assessments of consent ex post, though, was dispositive. Unless 
prompted to consider alternate explanations for transactional harms—firm 
wrongdoing or disclosure overload—subjects in these studies understood 
transactional harms as products of consumer consent. 
This juxtaposition raises the possibility of a “procedural justice” of 
contracts. In psychology, procedural justice research describes the role of 
process in judgments of fairness. People are more willing to accept 
disadvantageously inequitable outcomes when they perceive that there was a 
fair process for determining who got what—even if there is clear evidence 
that the elements of procedural “fairness” were essentially meaningless.134 A 
classic example is as follows.135 Participants in a laboratory experiment were 
each to be assigned a certain number of tasks, such that some participants 
would bear a heavier burden than others. They were randomly assigned to 
one of two conditions, voice or no voice. In the voice condition, subjects 
could express an opinion about the number of tasks they had been assigned. 
In the no voice condition, they were not invited to do so. The opinions 
expressed by those in the voice condition had no bearing on the number of 
tasks they were assigned, and this was transparent to the subjects themselves. 
Nonetheless, those who had a “voice” judged the assignment procedure to 
be fairer and judged their own number of assigned tasks to be more 
acceptable. In other words, the pretense of a fair process was enough to 
quell objections to arbitrary outcomes. 
The results I have presented here are troubling for that reason; they 
suggest that the presence of disclosures may have implicit effects on 
attributions of consent and blame that most consumers and most 
policymakers would not anticipate. Thus, we might be ambivalent about 
whether a consumer has really consented to some hidden term. Given our 
ambivalence, we might assume that doubts about the consent will factor into 
decisions about enforcement. When it is time to ask questions about 
enforcement, though, the fact of the disclosure is dispositive. Some 
commentators have argued that even though it is true that disclosures are 
probably ineffective, they “can’t hurt.”136 My contention is that this kind of 
attitude leads to overuse of disclosures that do not affect consumer decision-
 
 134. See, e.g., E. Allan Lind, Ruth Kanfer & P. Christopher Earley, Voice, Control, and 
Procedural Justice: Instrumental and Noninstrumental Concerns in Fairness Judgments, 59 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 952, 95556 (1990). 
 135. See generally id. at 954–55 (describing a study in which some participants were given a 
voice and others were not, finding that participants that were given a voice were happier with 
the outcome).  
 136. See Hillman, supra note 18, at 295–300. 
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making, but have implicit effects on the moral calculus of transactional 
harms. 
In the tort and criminal law contexts, psychologists have identified a 
similar problem with respect to the fair process effect. Someone who is 
thinking about what constitutes a fair process would not conclude that the 
ability to contribute feedback into a never-opened suggestion box is the 
same as having a meaningful voice in the process.137 Nonetheless, the ability 
to put comments in that box affects how people view the fairness of the 
resulting outcome. Similarly, in contract, most people are troubled by the 
unrealistic demands on consumers to consent to terms that they cannot 
read. Nonetheless, the mere fact of the signature or the “I Agree” click has a 
profound effect on how they view the outcomes of that transaction. 
The fair process effect may be something of a heuristic.138 It is probably 
sensible in many applications, but it raises thorny questions for the 
normative standing of consent. As psychologist Robert MacCoun says: “In 
the procedural justice domain, the concern is that authorities can use the 
appearance of fair procedure (dignity, respect, voice) as an inexpensive way 
to coopt citizens and distract them from outcomes that by normative criteria 
might be considered substantively unfair or biased.”139 On the other hand: 
“[T]here is also discomfort with the implicit notion that we scholars can 
assert that ordinary people are mistaken in their understanding of their 
social world—a notion that seems politically elitist and epistemologically 
naive.”140 In the context of contract, the concern is that sophisticated parties 
(e.g., corporations and other repeat players) use consumer consent in a 
distorted way—presenting disclosures or terms that consumers will not read, 
but will nonetheless insulate the firm from both legal liability and consumer 
backlash. 
The literature on procedural justice has largely overlooked (with the 
notable exception of Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff’s studies of just 
negotiation141) the possibility of a troubling fair process effect in 
transactional contexts. The evidence from this Essay suggests that at least 
some attributions of consent to unfavorable terms outweigh thin, formalistic 
assent procedures that most observers would find problematic if assessing 
 
 137. See Josh Bowers & Paul H. Robinson, Perceptions of Fairness and Justice:  The Shared Aims 
and Occasional Conflicts of Legitimacy and Moral Credibility, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 211, 238–39 
n.118 (2012) (reviewing literature suggesting that even non-meaningful participation leads 
people to view a process as more fair). 
 138. As noted above, a heuristic is a rule of thumb that individuals use when they do not 
have information about the distribution of outcomes. 
 139. Robert MacCoun, Voice, Control, and Belonging: The Double-Edged Sword of Procedural 
Fairness, 1 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 171, 189 (2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1693356. 
 140. Id. 
 141. See Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Just Negotiation, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 381 (2010); 
Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice in Negotiation: Procedural Fairness, 
Outcome Acceptance, and Integrative Potential, 33 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 473 (2008). 
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them in the context of contract formation. My hope is that this project is the 
first in a larger research agenda around transactional procedural justice. 
CONCLUSION 
The problem that I have raised in this Essay has vexed legal scholars for 
decades: How seriously should contract law take consent in a world in which 
consumers must consent lightly to most of their contractual obligations? The 
common wisdom is that the approach that we have isn’t working. Yet, 
regulating contracts by mandating disclosure serves a normative function, 
even as we acknowledge that it fails its ostensible communicative function. 
Indeed, this view is reasonable enough as long as the limits of the legal 
fiction are equally salient ex post as they are ex ante. 
The experiments I have presented here raise the possibility that 
although people agree that disclosures do not have noticeable effects on the 
assent process, they have enormous effects on how we understand 
transactional harms. That is, the grain of salt with which people take consent 
to standard terms is nowhere to be found when the question is whether a 
consumer is to blame for having agreed to an unfavorable term. Any 
objective manifestation of assent is highly salient in the attribution of 
culpability for transactional harms, obscuring procedural defects that people 
are otherwise quick to identify. The next steps in the study of the moral 
psychology of contract must take on the possibility that consumer consent, 
and attributions of consumer consent, are more complex than we have 
allowed. 
 
